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now make credit sales to any person presenting a card with the card itself
being sufficient identity of the person presenting the card.
It has been suggested that all credit cards should have a signature block
and photograph of the card holder, and that the card holder be protected
by insurance."5 Illinois and Massachusetts have already taken action on the
credit card problem.' As to unauthorized purchases made prior to notifi-
cation of loss or theft of the card, the Illinois statute limits the card
holder's liability to $75 if the card has a signature block and to $25 if
the card has no signature block." The statute seems to unreasonably dis-
criminate against the card issuer-seller because there is no difference in the
maximum possible liability of an innocent card holder and a negligent
card holder. Also, as in the Union Oil case, the burden is on the seller to
prove that he exercised due care in making unauthorized credit card sales.
As a result, the card issuer-seller is effectively made insurer for any losses
which may arise from the unauthorized use of a credit card notwithstand-
ing the negligence of the card holder.
A suggested statute for Texas would limit card holder liability to $100
if the card has no signature block, $200 if the card has a signature block,
and $400 if the card has a signature block and photograph of the card
holder. Furthermore, such a statute should provide that the maximum
possible liability be doubled in situations of card holder negligence. Neg-
ligence on the part of the seller should be a complete defense against any
recovery by the card issuer-seller. Such a statute would prevent a card
holder from becoming an insurer of a potentially unlimited loss resulting
from unauthorized purchases, and would provide a favorable balance of
the responsibilities and liabilities between the card issuer and card holder.
Charles G. White
New Limits on Court-Martial Jurisdiction:
O'Callahan v. Parker
O'Callahan, a sergeant in the United States Army, was stationed at Fort
Shafter in the Territory of Hawaii. While on leave with an evening pass,
he was arrested by the Honolulu police for assaulting and attempting to
rape a young girl in a civilian hotel. At the time of the offense and the
arrest, O'Callahan was wearing civilian clothes, but was delivered to the
military police after it was determined that he was a member of the armed
forces. O'Callahan was convicted by a court-martial of attempted rape,
'5 Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 811 (1967). American Express credit card holders are protected against loss above $100 even
if the card holder fails to report the loss or theft of the card.
28ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 Y2, § 382 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255,
12E (Supp. 1968). The Massachusetts statute limits recovery to a maximum of $100, but has
no provision concerning the burden of proof.
27ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121Y, S 382 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
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assault with attempt to rape, and housebreaking. The conviction was af-
firmed on appeal and he was placed in a federal penitentiary. While con-
fined, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the court-
martial had no jurisdiction to try him for an offense which was commit-
ted on leave and away from a military reservation. Relief on the petition
was denied.' Held, reversed: A military court-martial is without jurisdic-
tion to try a member of the armed forces for a peacetime offense that was
not service-connected and which was committed in the United States or its
territories. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
I. COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."' Pursuant to this grant of power, Congress has promulgated an
extensive Code governing the trial and punishment of military personnel.4
Even before the Constitution was drafted, the Continental Congress had
established, by the Articles of War in 1776, court-martial jurisdiction
over offenses having obvious military significance.! The offenses subject to
court-martial jurisdiction were not altered when the Articles were re-
enacted in 1789, and remained substantially unaltered through several
revisions.' In 1916, however, the Articles were revised to grant court-
martial jurisdiction over all offenses committed by members of the armed
7forces, except that jurisdiction over capital crimes was limited to war-
time.' Finally, in 1950, the Uniform Code of Military Justice extended
court-martial jurisdiction to include capital crimes even in peacetime.' This
jurisdiction remained unaltered with the 1968 amendments to the Code."
Despite the fact that the jurisdiction of courts-martial has progressively
been enlarged as to offenses, there has always been a fear of allowing that
jurisdiction to become too broad." Especially when the offense was one not
military in nature, the courts have been reluctant to allow court-martial
jurisdiction to expand because of the consequent loss of constitutional
rights." Nevertheless, the offenses subject to court-martial jurisdiction have
' The offenses charged were in violation of UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 80, 130,
134, 10 U.S.C. § 880, 930, 934 (1964).
aO'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
aU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, tit. 10 U.S.C. (1964).
5 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 1489 (2d ed. 1920).
6 Id.
7Art. 92 of the Articles of War of 1916, 39 Stat. 650, 664 (1916); Bishop, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1964).
"Art. 93 of the Articles of War of 1916, 39 Stat. 650, 664 (1916).
' UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §5 877-934 (1964).
0 Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1336 (1968).
" "The attitude of a free society toward the jurisdiction of military tribunals-our reluctance
to give them authority to try people for non-military offenses-has a long history." Lee v. Madi-
gan, 358 U.S. 228, 232 (1959).
", "Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest juris-
diction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service." Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955). For a discussion of the rights lost when an individual enters
the service, see, Comment, Military Justice and the Military Justice Act of 1968: How Far Have
We Come?, 23 Sw. L.J. 554 (1969).
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increased because the Congress was not limited by the Constitution as to
offenses in making the rules for the government and regulation of the
armed forces."
Historically, the determinative element of court-martial jurisdiction has
always been the "status" of the accused, i.e., whether he was a member
of the "land and naval Forces."' " If the requisite "status" was present, this
was sufficient for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over the person,
regardless of the nature of the offense." In cases where the requisite
"status" was not present, however, court-martial jurisdiction was denied,
even if the offense was one related in some way to the military. When the
necessary jurisdiction over the person existed, the subject-matter jurisdic-
tion of courts-martial was for Congress, rather than the courts, to deter-
mine. 7
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFFORDED MILITARY PERSONNEL
In granting Congress the power to make the rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces, the drafters of the Consti-
tution undoubtedly recognized that the exigencies of military operations
made it necessary to deny those in the armed services certain rights. Spe-
cifically, the right to indictment by a grand jury, guaranteed in the fifth
amendment, was excepted in cases arising in the land and naval forces."
Although not specifically excepted, the right to be tried by a jury was also
withheld, by implication, in military cases. 9 Constitutional rights not ex-
plicitly excepted, other than the right to jury trial, have also been denied
to military personnel.'
Recently, there has been an emphasis toward extending to military per-
sonnel more of the constitutional rights afforded to civilians. In Burns v.
Wilson"' the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, extended the
requirement of due process to military courts. In doing so, the Court stated
that "[t]he military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsi-
bility as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his
constitutional rights."2 The Court of Military Appeals, following Burns,
has extended the Miranda v. Arizona" "requirements," including the right
to have counsel present during interrogation, to apply to military per-
"ZKinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
" "[M]ilitary jurisdiction has always been based on the 'status' of the accused, rather than
on the nature of the offense." Id. at 243.
15 Id.
" When Congress attempted by UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. §
802 (1964), to subject civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas to court-
martial jurisdiction, this was held repugnant to Congress' constitutional power because of the
lack of the requisite "status" of the accused. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), and
the companion cases thereto.
17Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
's The phrase "when in actual service in time of war or public danger" is a limitation which
applies only to the militia, not to the land and naval forces. Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
'" Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
20 See note 12 supra.
2' 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
2 Id. at 142.
2'384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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sonnel 4 In reaching its decision, the Court of Military Appeals said that
Burns was "an unequivocal holding by the Supreme Court that the pro-
tections of the Constitution are available to servicemen in military trials
* . .except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inappli-
cable .... ." Burns, and the way it has been interpreted, seems to mark
a trend to broaden the constitutional rights afforded to servicemen.
II. SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSE-NEw ELEMENT OF COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION
In O'Callahan v. Parker" the Supreme Court added a new element that
must be considered in determining court-martial jurisdiction. While rec-
ognizing that the "status" of the accused is necessary for such jurisdiction,
the Court held that "status" alone was not sufficient. Before a court-
martial acquires jurisdiction, the offense must be "service-connected." If
the offense does not have the requisite connection with the military, then
the civilian, rather than the military courts, have jurisdiction. This was
found even though the fifth amendment excludes these rights "in cases
arising in the land or naval forces.""7
Recognizing that indictment and trial by jury were not necessary in
such cases, the Court reached its decision by interpreting the constitutional
provision that gives Congress the power "to make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."2 That Congress pos-
sesses this power was not denied. However, in exercising this power, the
Court found that no conflict should arise with the Bill of Rights, and
since the offense must be "service-connected" to arise in the land and naval
forces, Congress could not subject a person to court-martial jurisdiction
merely on the grounds that he was a member of the armed services.
O'Callahan thus limits congressional power to establish court-martial jur-
isdiction by redefining the phrase, "cases arising in the land and naval
Forces," to include only cases having military significance rather than all
cases involving an offense committed by a member of the military.
In limiting the power of Congress to establish court-martial jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court relied heavily on the dictum in Toth v. Quarles," a case
in which an attempt was made to assert court-martial jurisdiction over a
discharged soldier. The holding in that case could not be used as precedent
for O'Callahan because jurisdiction was denied the court-martial in Toth
as a result of the absence of the requisite "status."" ° The dictum relied on
in Toth relates mainly to the inferiority of military courts, as compared
with civilian courts, in dispensing justice and protecting the rights of the
24 United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
25ld. at 634.
2' 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
27 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.28 Id.
2350 U.S. 11 (1955).
"
0 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), involved a discharged soldier who had been tried by
court-martial for an offense committed before his discharge. The court-martial was denied jurisdic-




accused. This reliance is weak, not only because it is dictum and the facts
are distinguishable, but also because the Court took little notice of the
efforts for improving the quality of courts-martial justice."' Although
much of what the Court stated about the quality of courts-martial may
have been true in the past, it is debatable whether or not the arguments
will be valid in the future."
The Court also placed considerable reliance on the historical limitations
of court-martial jurisdiction. However, this was again drawn from dictum
contained in a case decided on grounds of the absence of the requisite
"status. '"" The O'Callahan dissent pointed out that nothing in the history
of court-martial jurisdiction was binding since the Constitution does not
limit such jurisdiction to the extent it was exercised in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries." Also, the dissent expressed the view that the
majority ignored many facts of history that weakened, rather than
strengthened, their view.
Not only did the Court have little on which to base the addition of the
"service-connected" offense, it also ignored the precedential value of some
of its own prior decisions. In the same case from which the Court drewits historical argument," it was stated that the "natural meaning" of the
term "land and naval Forces" in clause 14 "refers to persons who are
members of the armed services."3 It was also stated that accordingly, the
exceptions of the fifth amendment refer to persons "in the armed serv-
ices.""' Even the stronger language of a more recent case was also re-
jected. In Kinsella v. Singleton" the Court stated that "military jurisdic-
tion has always been based on the 'status' of the accused, rather than the
nature of the offense" and that the language of article 140 unambiguously
defines military jurisdiction in terms of "status."' Even though presented
to the Court, the clear language of this, as well as other cases,- was not
accepted. It would seem, therefore, that the Court was acting in keeping
with its recent emphasis on procedural due process rather than trying to
apply the language of past decisions.
" See Comment, supra note 12, for a discussion of the improvements made by the Military
Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1336 (1968).
" See generally O'Malley, Broader Justice For Military Personnel, T TRIAL 45 (Dec./Jan.
1968-69); Sherman, Revised Military Code: A Qualified Assent, 5 TRIAL 44 (Dec./Jan. 1968-69).
'3 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
"4The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Stewart and White.
395 U.S. 258, 274 (1969).
" The dissent stated that other considerations entered into the history of court-martial jurisdic-
tion, such as the struggle for power between the Crown and the military on the one hand, and thi
Parliament on the other. These other considerations cause history to be a weak point on which to
depend for the majority decision. Also, the dissent stated that the balance of interests between the
needs of the military and the need of protecting individual rights should enter into the decision. The
majority looked only at the need to protect the rights of the individual. 395 U.S. 258, 276-84
(1969).
26 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
"I1d. at 19-20.
38 Id. at 22-23.
'9361 U.S. 234 (1960).
"0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
" Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 243 (1960).
42Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895);
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879).
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NOTES
IV. LIMITATIONS AND IMPACT OF O'CALLAHAN
Exactly how much O'Callahan limits the jurisdiction of courts-martial
is not clear. The failure of the Court to define the term "service-con-
nected" has caused the extent of court-martial jurisdiction to be placed in
doubt. In determining if an offense is "service-connected," the Court im-
plies that the relevant factors to be considered are: (1) 'Whether or not the
accused was in uniform at the time the offense was committed; (2)
whether the accused was on leave or was performing military duties;
(3) whether or not the offense occurred on a military reservation; (4)
whether or not the victim, if any, was a member of the military or was
performing duties related to the military; (5) whether or not the offense
had a connection with military authority or the flouting of military au-
thority; and (6) whether or not the offense was committed within the
boundaries of the United States or its territories. These factors are, how-
ever, merely those that were apparently considered by the Court in decid-
ing O'Callahan and are not definite guidelines.'
Since there is not a clear definition of "service-connected" from the
Court, the full impact of O'Callahan cannot be determined. Until further
elucidation of the term is given by the Court, it will often be difficult to
determine under what fact situations offenses will be under civilian, rather
than military, jurisdiction when the accused is a member of the armed
forces. If given its fullest impact, an extremely heavy case load will be
placed on civilian prosecutors and courts in areas adjacent to military bases.
This would create a definite problem since many of these prosecutors and
courts are already burdened by inadequate resources and small staffs. An
even more important problem might arise if O'Callahan is construed to be
retroactive. In this event, all of those persons now confined as the result
of a court-martial would have adequate grounds for a release under a
writ of habeas corpus if the offense for which they were convicted was
not "service-connected." The result would undoubtedly be a tremendous
amount of litigation.
Regardless of the impact of O'Callahan, however, it is consistent with
the trend of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, whenever
possible, to broaden the rights of members of the armed services. If this
trend continues in the future, the traditional structures of the military
will be forced to change drastically in order to be able to grant service-
men their rights.
Donald L. Sweatt
In a military justice opinion issued by the Military Justice Division, Office of the Judge Ad-
vocate General, U.S. Army, it appears that the military intends to apply O'Callahan narrowly. The
opinion stated that courts-martial should continue to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses in viola-
tion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice unless the facts of the case bring it squarely within
the O'Callahan decision. 1969 J.A.G.J. 8399 (June 4, 1969).
1969]
